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Explaining	variation	within	the	meta-problem	
	
Abstract	
	
It	is	a	working	assumption	in	much	of	the	literature	on	the	meta-problem	that	
problem	intuitions	are	(fairly)	universal,	and	they	are	(fairly)	universally	treated	as	
being	psychological	or	rationally	significant.	I	argue	that	variation	in	the	universality	
and	psychological	or	rational	significance	of	problem	intuitions	is	worth	taking	
seriously,	and	that	doing	so	places	significant	and	challenging	constraints	on	what	an	
answer	to	the	meta-problem	might	look	like.	In	particular,	it	raises	a	potential	
challenge	for	(full	blown)	realists	on	how	solutions	to	the	meta-problem	link	to	the	
hard	problem.	
	
Introduction	
	
I	am	one	of	those	people	who	doesn’t	think	that	there’s	a	(genuine)	hard	problem.	I	
have	argued	elsewhere	for	a	position	of	scientific	eliminativism	about	the	concept	of	
consciousness	(2012),	and	for	a	Type	Q(uinian)	approach	to	consciousness	and	the	
hard	problem	more	generally	(2017).	More	so	than	others,	this	kind	of	position	very	
obviously	demands	addressing	the	meta-problem:	“…the	problem	of	explaining	why	
we	think	that	there	is	a	problem	of	consciousness”	(Chalmers	2018,	p.	6).		
	
Chalmers	(2018)	outlines	an	approach	to	the	meta-problem	as	essentially	a	search	
for	an	explanation	of	why	people	have	problem	intuitions,	or	more	properly,	why	
they	have	dispositions	to	generate	phenomenal	reports	that	express	problem	
intuitions.	Problem	intuitions	are	the	sort	that	“reflect	our	sense	that	there	is	some	
sort	of	special	problem	involving	consciousness”	(op	cit,	p.	12).		
	
The	theme	of	this	short	commentary	is	to	work	on	the	‘we’	and	‘our’	in	these	
quotations.	I	take	it	that	the	‘we’	minimally	refers	to	members	of	philosophical	and	
scientific	communities	interested	in	consciousness	(perhaps	also	the	general	public).	
Clearly,	it	is	possible	that	even	if	‘we’	don’t	all	take	the	hard	problem	that	seriously,	
or	have	problem	intuitions,	that	‘we’	can	still	find	the	meta-problem	of	interest.	But	
it	is	a	working	assumption	in	much	of	the	literature	on	the	meta-problem	that	‘we’	
really	do	all	have	these	problem	intuitions,	and	that	we	find	them	fairly	significant.		
	
I	argue	that	these	assumptions	are	worth	questioning.	First,	I	argue	that	one	should	
take	seriously	the	possibility	that	problem	intuitions	are	not	(all)	universal,	and	that	
doing	so	places	significant	and	challenging	constraints	on	what	an	answer	to	the	
meta-problem	might	look	like.	In	particular,	it	raises	a	potential	challenge	for	(full	
blown)	realists	on	how	solutions	to	the	meta-problem	link	to	the	hard	problem.	
Second,	I	raise	the	issue	of	variation	in	how	much	‘psychological	weight’	people	give	
to	problem	intuitions.	After	all,	merely	having	an	intuition	does	not	mean	that	one	
automatically	treats	it	seriously	in	reasoning	or	uses	it	to	generate	philosophical	
problems.	A	full	and	satisfactory	answer	to	the	meta-problem	therefore	demands	
consideration	of	both	these	potential	forms	of	variation	concerning	problem	
intuitions.	
	
Variation	in	problem	intuitions	
	
This	first	issue	is	dealt	with	briefly	by	Chalmers:	that	there	might	be	variation	in	
problem	intuitions	about	consciousness.	Some	people	might	only	have	some	of	
them,	and	some	people	might	not	have	problem	intuitions	at	all.	Chalmers	states	
early	on	that	“A	fully	adequate	solution	to	the	meta-problem	should	be	able	to	
explain	not	only	why	these	intuitions	are	widely	shared,	if	they	are,	but	also	why	
they	are	not	universal,	if	indeed	they	are	not”	(op	cit,	p.	14).	Even	if	it	is	found	that	
problem	intuitions	are	not	universal,	Chalmers	notes	that	explaining	the	limited	
(non-universal)	presence	of	problem	intuitions	“will	still	be	of	considerable	interest”	
(op	cit,	p.	15).		
	
Rightly	pointed	out	by	Chalmers,	there	is	still	a	lot	of	empirical	work	to	do	to	identify	
whether	problem	intuitions	are	indeed	universal,	or	more	specifically,	which	ones	(if	
any).	Within	experimental	philosophy	and	psychology,	there	is	also	work	to	do	to	
design	studies	that	elicit	responses	that	accurately	track	intuitions	about	
consciousness	(as	reviewed	in	e.g.	Systma	2014).	Other	more	linguistic	and	
ethnographic	methods	are	available	too,	which	deserve	further	development	and	
consideration	(e.g.	Wierzbicka	2010;	Wilkes,	1988).	
	
However,	despite	this,	Chalmers	takes	it	as	a	working	assumption	(as	do	many	
others)	that	problem	intuitions	of	at	least	some	kinds	are	universal.	Much	of	the	
paper	proceeds	in	light	of	this.	Presumably,	if	it	turns	out	that	problem	intuitions	are	
not	all	universal,	we	can	deal	with	that	later:	one	has	to	start	somewhere.	However,	
the	possibility	that	problem	intuitions	concerning	phenomenal	consciousness	are	not	
universal	is	I	think	worth	taking	just	as	seriously	as	a	starting	point.	We	have,	after	
all,	very	little	evidence	either	way.	From	the	little	evidence	we	do	have,	there	is	at	
least	some	(contested)	support	for	the	idea	that	people	think	very	different	things	
about	consciousness	(Systma	2014).	This	I	think	gives	us	enough	reason	to	consider	
the	possibility	that	some	people	just	might	not	have	problem	intuitions	about	
consciousness	at	all.	As	I	argue	next	though,	this	does	not	sit	well	with	the	answers	
to	the	meta-problem	currently	on	offer.	
	
In	the	paper,	Chalmers	(2018)	surveys	a	wide	range	of	explanations	for	the	existence	
of	problem	intuitions	about	consciousness,	many	(though	not	all)	from	the	illusionist	
end	of	the	spectrum.	These	explanations	appear	to	be	based	on	the	same	working	
assumption	held	by	Chalmers,	that	problem	intuitions	are	universal.	To	explain	these	
intuitions,	these	accounts	typically	appeal	to	the	nature	of	introspection	and	our	
access	to	our	mental	lives,	and	deployment	of	phenomenal	and	physical	concepts.	
The	apparent	aim	is	to	describe	some	deep-seated	features	of	our	cognitive	
machinery	that	makes	the	emergence	of	problem	intuitions	entirely	unsurprising.	
Indeed,	one	of	Chalmers’	common	criticisms	of	these	accounts	is	that	they	do	not	
show	that	the	emergence	of	problem	intuitions	is	‘inevitable’	or	‘automatic’	or	
otherwise	obviously	likely.		
	
If	one	seriously	considers	the	possibility	that	problem	intuitions	are	not	universal,	
this	approach	to	the	meta-problem	starts	to	look	problematic.	To	see	this	in	more	
detail,	it	is	worth	quoting	Chalmers’	summary	of	what	he	sees	as	the	most	promising	
approach	in	full:	
	
“We	have	introspective	models	deploying	introspective	concepts	of	our	internal	
states	that	are	largely	independent	of	our	physical	concepts.	These	concepts	are	
introspectively	opaque,	not	revealing	any	of	the	underlying	physical	or	
computational	mechanisms.	Our	perceptual	models	perceptually	attribute	primitive	
perceptual	qualities	to	the	world,	and	our	introspective	models	attribute	primitive	
mental	relations	to	those	qualities.	We	seem	to	have	immediate	knowledge	that	we	
stand	in	these	primitive	mental	relations	to	primitive	qualities,	and	we	have	the	
sense	of	being	acquainted	with	them.”	(op	cit,	p.	34)	
		
I	take	it	that	the	introspective	and	perceptual	models	described	here,	the	
relationships	between	the	concepts	described,	and	the	‘seemings’	and	‘sensings’	are	
supposed	to	be	universal	(via	the	‘we’).		
	
Now	the	question	is:	what	about	this	cognitive	machinery	would	be	different	
between	people	who	have	problem	intuitions	and	those	who	don’t?	Presumably	
cognitively	‘normal’	humans	all	share	the	same	perceptual	‘model’	mentioned	here,	
which	is	related	to	the	idea	that	we	attribute	apparently	irreducible	qualities	
(colours)	to	objects.	And	presumably	introspective	concepts	are	generally	opaque	
with	respect	to	the	physical	or	computational	mechanisms	behind	them,	if	we	think	
that	introspection	always	works	in	a	certain	way.		
	
One	possibility	is	that	people	without	problem	intuitions	just	have	different	
introspective	concepts	entirely,	that	are	perhaps	somehow	linked	with	physical	
concepts,	or	that	otherwise	somehow	don’t	generate	problem	intuitions.	Another	
possibility	is	that	introspection	somehow	works	differently	for	them,	perhaps	with	
more	access	to	the	mechanisms	that	generate	the	states	that	they	are	focused	on.	
Or	perhaps	it	is	something	else	entirely.	In	either	case,	we	would	be	owed	an	
explanation	of	this	surprising	variation	in	our	cognitive	machinery,	and	of	how	
exactly	it	works	in	these	cases.		
	
The	problem	here	is	that	the	deeper	you	go	into	basic	and	widely	shared	cognitive	
machinery	in	order	to	explain	cases	where	people	do	have	problem	intuitions,	and	
have	them	inevitably,	the	more	difficult	it	becomes	to	explain	possible	cases	where	
people	do	not	have	them.	On	the	face	of	it,	I	take	it	that	this	should	be	avoided.	It	
might	be	the	case	that	the	reason	why	people	without	problem	intuitions	don’t	have	
them	is	that	they	just	have	a	radically	different	system	of	perception	and/or	
introspection,	but	this	seems	unlikely	and	a	little	ad	hoc.	This	is	particularly	true	if	
one	talks	about	perception	(e.g.	of	colours)	and	introspection	in	computational	or	
systems	terms:	colour	representations	provide	short-cut	ways	of	identifying	and	
comparing	objects,	and	introspection	does	something	similar	at	a	higher	level.	I	take	
it	that	we	should	avoid	positing	that	some	people	run	on	radically	different	
computational	systems	to	others.	
	
The	difference	between	those	who	have	problem	intuitions	and	those	that	don’t	is	
then	presumably	more	shallow,	i.e.	not	related	to	very	basic	cognitive	structure,	and	
instead	related	to	something	more	naturally	variable.	One	possibility	is	that,	in	
contrast	to	an	implicit	assumption	built	into	the	model	quoted	above,	introspective	
processes	are	actually	pretty	variable	in	general	and	are	open	to	all	sorts	of	inputs	
and	effects,	and	so	not	always	very	structurally	similar	across	time	and	people	
anyway	(e.g.	Schwitzgebel	2012).	This	might	mean	in	turn	that	introspective	
concepts	vary	across	people	in	how	they	are	developed	and	applied,	and	what	their	
core	properties	are	(e.g.	to	what	extent	they	are	opaque	and	independent	of	
physical	concepts).	A	lot	more	detail	needs	to	be	provided	here,	but	it	is	at	least	a	lot	
easier	and	a	lot	more	plausible	to	explain	variation	in	problem	intuitions	in	terms	of	
more	shallow	(and	less	universal)	cognitive	factors,	rather	than	in	deep	differences	in	
computational	systems.		
	
In	turn,	this	has	interesting	implications	for	how	answers	to	the	meta-problem	link	to	
the	hard	problem,	particularly	for	realists.	For	realists,	consciousness	should	(ideally)	
be	closely	connected	with	the	mechanisms	that	drive	the	generation	of	intuitions	
about	it.	As	Chalmers	writes,	“…a	realist	should	expect	that	our	judgments	about	
consciousness	are	the	way	they	are	because	consciousness	is	the	way	it	is,	or	at	least	
because	the	basis	of	consciousness	is	the	way	it	is”	(Chalmers	2018,	p.	36).		
	
The	more	appealing	realist	possibilities	are	cases	where	properties	of	phenomenal	
states	are	somehow	directly	linked	to	the	generation	of	an	(accurate)	intuition	about	
those	properties.	As	Chalmers	outlines	in	Section	6,	the	way	to	get	a	tight	connection	
here	is	for	consciousness	to	realise	(rather	than	somehow	inform,	or	correlate	with)	
some	part	of	the	process	that	generates	problem	intuitions.	In	this	case,	
consciousness	will	be	a	‘primary	cause’	of	our	problem	intuitions.		
	
Depending	on	exactly	how	this	is	supposed	to	work	though,	it	may	make	it	hard	to	
see	how	it	would	be	possible	for	someone	to	have	phenomenal	consciousness	(as	
the	full	blown	realist	thinks	of	it),	but	not	have	problem	intuitions	about	it.	Having	
phenomenal	consciousness,	on	this	view,	means	you	have	some	of	the	core	
machinery	that	generates	problem	intuitions.	Of	course,	being	a	primary	cause	of	
problem	intuitions	is	not	the	same	as	being	a	causal	determinant	of	them,	but	it	is	
worth	noting	a	tension	here.		
	
Similar	to	the	problem	above,	the	tension	here	is	that	the	more	causal	work	
phenomenal	consciousness	is	supposed	to	do	in	generating	problem	intuitions,	the	
closer	the	connection	is	between	the	hard	problem	and	the	meta-problem:	the	
reason	that	we	have	problem	intuitions	is	that	consciousness	is	actually	this	way.	A	
strong	realist	position	demands	a	close	connection.	But	the	more	causal	work	
phenomenal	consciousness	is	supposed	to	do	in	generating	problem	intuitions,	the	
harder	it	is	to	account	for	potential	variation	in	problem	intuitions.		
	
Again,	in	order	to	account	for	the	possibility	that	problem	intuitions	are	not	
universal,	one	must	instead	explain	the	existence	of	problem	intuitions	in	terms	of	
more	shallow	and	more	naturally	variable	processes.	But	as	you	go	more	shallow,	
less	explanatory	work	on	the	meta-problem	is	done	in	terms	of	cognitive	machinery	
directly	related	to	or	realized	by	phenomenal	consciousness.	Clearly,	this	loosens	the	
connection	between	solutions	to	the	meta-problem	and	phenomenal	consciousness,	
which	is	not	a	good	move	for	the	realist.	And	again,	depending	on	exactly	how	this	
works,	it	may	raise	a	problem	outlined	by	Chalmers,	that	“One	may	still	worry	about	
whether	[consciousness]	plays	a	central	enough	role,	not	least	because	the	structure	
of	the	processes	may	seem	to	explain	our	intuitions	even	without	consciousness…”	
(op	cit,	p.	42).	There	may	of	course	be	a	happy	middle	ground	here	between	
phenomenal	consciousness	playing	a	significant	but	not	decisive	role	in	generating	
problem	intuitions	(in	cognitively	‘normal’	people),	and	in	answering	the	meta-
problem,	but	this	needs	work.		
	
In	response	to	this	line	of	argument,	one	might	object1	that	if	there	is	variation	
across	people	in	whether	they	have	problem	intuitions	at	all,	and	if	this	is	best	
explained	by	shallow	cognitive	factors,	we	should	also	expect	variation	across	a	
person’s	lifetime	in	whether	they	have	them	or	not.	That	is,	if	problem	intuitions	are	
generated	by	shallow	cognitive	factors,	then	it	seems	that	it	should	be	easier	to	
switch	between	having	them	and	not.	The	problem	is	that	some	people	at	least	
seem	to	consistently	have	problem	intuitions,	no	matter	how	many	illusionist	
arguments	they	encounter.	This	could	be	taken	as	a	reason	to	think	both	that	deep	
cognitive	explanations	of	problem	intuitions	are	more	satisfying,	as	they	can	deal	
with	these	cases,	and	perhaps	further	to	question	whether	we	really	should	expect	
to	find	genuine	variation	in	problem	intuitions	across	people.	
	
However,	it	is	important	to	note	that	appealing	to	‘shallow’	cognitive	factors	to	
explain	problem	intuitions	is	relative.	Chalmers’	(and	others’)	explanations	of	the	
source	of	problem	intuitions	appeal	to	fundamental	features	of	perceptual	
processing	and	the	structure	of	introspection;	universal	computational	features	of	
beings	like	us.	In	cognitive	terms,	there	is	a	lot	that	is	‘shallow’	compared	to	this	that	
is	still	pretty	deep.	‘Shallow’	factors	may,	for	example,	include	particular	styles	or	
structures	of	thinking,	entrenched	values	or	general	academic	or	aesthetic	
commitments,	systematic	biases	in	information	selection,	weighting	and	reasoning,	
and	more.	Despite	being	‘shallow’	compared	to	core	features	of	universal	
computational	processes,	these	may	be	very	hard	to	change.	The	sense	in	which	they	
are	shallow	is	merely	that	they	vary	across	a	population.	From	this,	it	does	not	follow	
that	finding	variation	in	problem	intuitions	across	a	population	means	that	we	
should	expect	to	see	variation	within	individuals	across	their	lifetime.	Indeed,	the	
sources	of	variation	across	people	may	be	sufficiently	‘deep’	that	dispositions	
regarding	problem	intuitions	may	be	fairly	stable	in	individuals,	at	least	from	a	
certain	point	onwards.		
	
In	light	of	this	then,	there	is	a	case	to	be	made	that	accounting	for	variation	in	
problem	intuitions	is	more	easily	dealt	with	by	some	kind	of	illusionist	view	(either	
weak	or	strong).	If	there	is	no	great	link	to	be	preserved	between	the	hard	problem	
																																																								
1	Thanks	to	Francois	Kammerer	for	raising	this.	
and	the	meta-problem,	such	that	the	content	of	problem	intuitions	is	directly	linked	
to	properties	of	phenomenal	consciousness,	then	variation	across	problem	intuitions	
can	be	more	easily	explained	in	terms	of	naturally	variable	and	more	cognitively	
shallow	factors.	This	is	obviously	very	far	from	a	knock-down	argument.	It	does	
though,	I	hope,	suggest	that	variation	in	problem	intuitions	is	something	that	
demands	consideration,	and	may	have	substantial	implications	for	what	an	adequate	
solution	to	the	meta-problem,	and	the	hard	problem,	would	look	like.	
	
Another	form	of	variation	
	
There	is	another	form	of	variation	that	needs	to	be	considered	in	framing	what	we	
mean	by	the	meta-problem.	The	meta-problem	is	set	up	as	the	question	of	why	
people	have	dispositions	to	generate	phenomenal	reports	that	express	problem	
intuitions.	But	merely	having	problem	intuitions	does	not	automatically	generate	a	
(philosophically	significant)	problem	of	consciousness.	This	is	because	in	order	for	
problem	intuitions	to	generate	a	genuine	problem	of	consciousness,	at	least	some	
people	need	to	take	them	seriously,	where	these	intuitions	and	the	reasoning	and	
judgements	they	lead	to	are	not,	as	Chalmers	puts	it,	‘psychologically	outweighed	by	
other	forces’	(op	cit,	p.	14).	This	is	because	people	have	intuitions	about	all	sort	of	
things,	that	may	be	commonly	shared,	that	never	see	the	light	of	day	because	they	
are	quickly	overridden	by	relevant	knowledge	or	reasoning.	The	second	type	of	
variation	that	needs	to	be	addressed	then	is	variation	in	how	psychologically	weighty	
problem	intuitions	are	to	different	people,	providing	they	have	them	at	all.	The	
meta-problem	then	becomes	the	question	of	why	people	have	dispositions	to	
generate	phenomenal	reports	that	express	problem	intuitions,	where	these	
intuitions	are	at	least	sometimes	treated	as	being	philosophically	significant.	
	
This	may	tie	into	the	particular	sets	of	machinery	we	posit	to	deal	with	the	meta-
problem:	is	there	within	this	machinery	any	variation	in	terms	of	how	salient	or	how	
clearly	presented	problem	intuitions	are,	or	how	easily	generated	they	are?	That	is,	
perhaps	there	is	a	sense	in	which	these	intuitions	are	stronger	in	some	people	than	
in	others.	Alternatively,	the	variation	could	be	traced	elsewhere:	perhaps	for	some	
people,	intuitions	are	just	generally	more	weighty	in	their	(philosophical)	reasoning.	
Or	perhaps	there	is	something	about	the	generation	of	these	intuitions,	compared	to	
the	generation	of	other	intuitions	(e.g.	about	moral	matters)	that	makes	them	
particularly	pressing	for	specific	individuals.	
	
I	think	this	is	an	interesting	question	for	all	sides.	If	(full	blown)	realists	are	right,	and	
problem	intuitions	are	tightly	connected	to	and	driven	by	phenomenal	
consciousness,	it	would	be	good	to	know	why	some	people	who	have	these	
(accurate)	intuitions	were	swayed	by	something	else	and	became	illusionists	(what	
went	wrong!).	If	non-realists	(both	weak	and	strong	illusionists)	are	right,	then	it	
would	be	good	to	know	what	it	is	about	the	intuitions	that	we	nevertheless	have	
that	mean	that	some	people	find	them	very	significant,	and	others	don’t.		
	
There	is	not	much	empirical	literature	that	is	obviously	relevant	to	these	questions.	
While	there	is	a	wealth	of	literature	on	‘intuition’	in	decision-making,	particularly	in	
dual	process	models,	much	of	this	tends	to	treat	intuition	as	a	rather	generic	process	
(or	set	of	processes)	for	producing	judgments	(e.g.	Evans	&	Stanovich	2013).	There	
has	been	some	work	identifying	the	different	cognitive	mechanisms	that	might	
underlie	intuition,	such	as	associative	mechanisms,	automatic	evidence	
accumulation,	comparison	to	prototypes,	familiarity/ease	of	access	from	memory,	
and	so	on	(e.g.	Glöckner	and	Witteman	2010;	Gigerenzer	et	al.	2011).	These	domain	
general	mechanisms	are	very	different	to	the	model	suggested	by	Chalmers	above	
though,	where	intuitions	about	consciousness	are	generated	by	very	specific	and	
(apparently)	deep	structural	features	of	our	perceptual	and	introspective	machinery.	
So,	it’s	not	clear	how	findings	about	other	intuitive	processes	might	generalize	to	the	
rather	more	specific	case	of	interest	here.	For	the	same	reason,	one	might	worry	
about	how	to	generalize	other	findings	about	individual	differences	in	the	use	of	
intuitive	judgments	to	the	case	here.	In	sum	then,	more	work	is	required.	
	
Conclusion	
	
I	have	suggested	that	there	are	two	aspects	of	the	meta-problem	that	need	
exploration	if	we	are	to	identify	a	satisfying	explanation	of	why	we	think	that	there	is	
a	problem	of	consciousness.	The	first	aspect	is	the	possible	variation	in	who	has	
problem	intuitions,	and	if	so,	which	ones.	I	argued	that	this	possible	variation	is	
worth	taking	seriously,	and	that	if	one	does,	then	the	kind	of	explanation	we	should	
expect	to	give	for	the	generation	of	problem	intuitions	would	appeal	to	much	more	
cognitively	shallow	factors	than	those	used	in	the	explanations	currently	on	offer.	In	
turn,	this	makes	it	harder	for	the	realist	to	maintain	a	tight	connection	between	
phenomenal	consciousness	and	our	intuitions	about	it.	Second,	I	argued	that	merely	
having	problem	intuitions	does	not	make	it	the	case	that	‘we’	would	think	there	is	a	
hard	problem,	or	meta-problem,	worth	taking	seriously.	A	full	explanation	of	the	
meta-problem	requires	more	detail	on	how	and	why	these	intuitions	are	
psychologically	weighty	for	some,	such	that	the	hard	problem	is	a	problem	that	
philosophical	and	scientific	communities	treat	as	an	important	one.	
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